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CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS: THE INTERTWINING OF
EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING AS EXEMPLIFIED
IN LEGAL ANALYSIS
GEORGE H. TAYLOR*

INTRODUCTION

One of the most vexing questions in hermeneutics is whether it
can be critical-whether it can engage in critique. The nature and
importance of the question are better revealed by situating the issue
within the larger context of recent hermeneutic analysis. One of the
many advances of hermeneutics, it is said, is its contribution to the
"interpretive turn" in the humanities and social sciences.1 In the wellknown words of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, analysis of culture is
now taken to require "not an experimental science in search of law
but an interpretive one in search of meaning. ' 2 While the interpretive
turn is more commonplace in the humanities, it has gained many
adherents in the social sciences as well3 and has led, for example, to
5
the rise of narrative approaches in both law' and sociology.
* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This Article was first
presented at a panel on hermeneutics at the annual conference on Law, Culture, and the
Humanities, held at Georgetown University Law Center, March 2000.
1. See, e.g., THE INTERPRETIVE TURN: PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, CULTURE (David R.
Hiley et al. eds., 1991). Another symposium participant, John Valauri, has an essay in this
volume. See John T. Valauri, Constitutional Hermeneutics, in THE INTERPRETIVE TURN:
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, CULTURE, supra, at 245.
2. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
3. See generally INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER (Paul Rabinow & William

M. Sullivan eds., 1979).
4. The debate on the role of narrative in law has been rich. See, e.g., LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); ROBIN WEST,
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). Although

much of this scholarship retains a critical element, other scholarship has been sharply
oppositional to narrative. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL
REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).

Jay Mootz has

responded eloquently to the Farber and Sherry critique. See Francis J. Mootz III, Between
Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 605 (1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra).
5. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWiCK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
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Traditionally, the divide between those in search of meaning and
those in search of law is understood to be one between "under-

standing" and "explanation." Hermeneutics, in this conception, falls
on the side of understanding, while the natural sciences-and social

sciences attempting to emulate them-fall on the side of explanation.
A rich literature has explored the differentiation. 6 Gadamer's Truth
and Method,7 first published in 1960, can be seen as an argument

encapsulated in its title: truth versus method, an argument in favor of
openness to truth and understanding through hermeneutic inquiry

and an objection to the arms-length, interrogatory method of
explanation found in the social and natural sciences. In the GadamerHabermas debate, 8 Gadamer's affinity is with understanding while

Habermas's is ultimately with explanation.
In my view, one of the signal contributions of Paul Ricoeur's
work is his attempt to mediate, from within hermeneutics, the debate
between understanding and explanation. Ricoeur applauds, for
example, Habermas's efforts to develop a critical social science, but in

turn criticizes Habermas for his failure to appreciate that these critical
sciences must finally be resituated within hermeneutics. "The critical
social sciences," writes Ricoeur, "allow us to make the detour
required to explain the principle of distortion, a detour necessary so
that we may recapture for understandingand self-understanding what
in fact has been distorted."9 In other writings, Ricoeur explores the
interrelation between understanding and explanation in broader

strokes, 10 and more generally it seems to me that the tension between

6. See, e.g., KARL-OTTo APEL, UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLANATION: A TRANSCENDENTAL-PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE (Georgia Warnke trans., MIT Press 1984) (1979);
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING (1971); UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977).
7. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960).
8. See, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology:
Metacritical Comments on Truth and Method, in THE HERMENEUTICS READER 274 (Kurt
Mueller-Vollmer ed., 1985); Jiirgen Habermas, On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality, in THE
HERMENEUTICS READER, supra, at 294.
9. PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 236 (George H. Taylor ed.,
1986) (emphasis added) [hereinafter RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA]. This
book contains two lectures on Habermas. See id. at 216, 232. Ricoeur evaluates the GadamerHabermas debate in two other essays. See PAUL RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of
Ideology, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, ACTION
AND INTERPRETATION 63 (John B. Thompson ed., trans., 1981) [hereinafter HERMENEUTICS
AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES]; Paul Ricoeur, Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in
Dialogue, in POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ESSAYS 243 (David Stewart & Joseph Bien eds., 1974).
10. See PAUL RICOEUR, What Is a Text? Explanation and Understanding, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 9, at 145; PAUL RICOEUR, The Model of the
Text: Meaningful Action ConsideredAs a Text, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,
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understanding and explanation lies at the heart of Ricoeur's theory of

interpretation. Interpretation, he claims, "functions at the intersection of two domains ....On one side, interpretation seeks the
clarity of the concept [i.e., explanation]; on the other, it hopes to
preserve the dynamism of meaning [i.e., understanding] that the
concept holds and pins down."" A few pages later, Ricoeur writes of
"the dialectic that reigns between the experience of belonging as a
whole and the power of distanciation that opens up the space of
12
speculative thought."
What is especially intriguing to me in these statements is to see

Ricoeur's emphasis that internal to interpretation is work seeking

"the clarity of the concept," work acknowledging the inexorability
within interpretation of "distanciation that opens up the space of
speculative thought." The dialectic is not one that proceeds from
naive understanding through a separate stage of explanation and then
back to more critical understanding; the element of distance, analysis,
critique is persistent throughout.1 3 Indeed, in more recent work
Ricoeur types the vocabulary of understanding and explanation

outmoded, preferring instead the terms "nomological explanation"explanation by laws-and "explanation by emplotment" 4-expla-

nation by narrative. To narrate, he writes, "is already to explain. '' 15
To tell a story is more than to recite a chronology; a narrative is a
supra note 9, at 197, 209-21 [hereinafter RICOEUR, The Model of the Text]; PAUL RICOEUR,
Explanation and Understanding: On Some Remarkable Connections Among the Theory of the
Text, Theory of Action, and Theory of History, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF HIS WORK 149 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart eds., 1978) [hereinafter
RICOEUR, Explanation and Understanding].
11. PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE
CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE 303 (Robert Czerny et al. trans., Univ. Toronto Press
1977) (1975) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR].
This definition of
interpretation is a more nuanced conception of a theme with origins much earlier in Ricoeur's
corpus. In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur's phrase is: "The symbol gives rise to thought."
PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 348 (Emerson Buchanan trans., 1967).
12. RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 11, at 313 (emphasis added).
Distanciation allows the possibility of critique "not without, but within hermeneutics." Paul
Ricoeur, Can There Be a Scientific Concept of Ideology?, in PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES: A DIALOGUE 44, 59 (Joseph Bien ed., 1978). Elsewhere I explore at
somewhat greater length these larger dimensions of Ricoeur's interpretive theory. See George
H. Taylor, Editor's Introduction to RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra
note 9, at ix, xxiii-xxxv.
13. Sometimes in Ricoeur's work it appears that the stages are more separable, see, e.g.,
RICOEUR, The Model of the Text, supra note 10, but that apprehension must be modified by
statements in the same works that "[u]nderstanding is entirely mediated by the whole of
explanatory procedures which precede it and accompany it."
Id. at 220.
14. 1 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 181 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David
Pellauer trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1984) (1983).
15. Id. at 178.
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construct,an effort to interrelate heterogeneous circumstances.16
I will not pursue Ricoeur's analysis further here, but his insights
inspire the remainder of my remarks, where I will largely turn to legal
inquiry. For convenience I will retain the vocabulary of understanding and explanation and will proceed in the following manner.
In Part I of this Article, I will show how within legal hermeneutics the
element of critique is present even within those forms of legal
interpretation most adherent to stances of "understanding." Here I
will concentrate on the work of Robert Bork and Justice Antonin
Scalia and demonstrate how distance, separation, critique is present
within their theories. In Part II, I will reverse emphases and show
how elements of "understanding" persist within legal theories most
avowedly reliant on forms of "explanation." My exemplar here is
recent work of Judge Richard Posner. 7 In Part III, I will explore
Judge Posner's larger critique of much contemporary legal theory, in
particular his criticisms of what he calls "top down" theory and
"bottom up" theory. My claim here is that the dialectic between
understanding and explanation that forms the character of
hermeneutics (explored in Parts I and II) responds to Posner's
critique. Finally, in Part IV, I will assess the import for law of its
being a product of both understanding and explanation. If Geertz
differentiates between "an experimental science in search of law" and
"an interpretive one in search of meaning," how is it possible to
recover a sense of "law" within the legal domain that encompasses
both? To address this issue, I will briefly advert to some work in
evolutionary theory by biologist Ernst Mayr. Mayr claims that
evolutionary biology itself does not proceed on the basis of
deterministic "laws."
Mayr's example from within the natural
sciences reinforces the point that there are other forms of "expla16. See id. Some postmodernist criticism condemns hermeneutics for imposing order-a
narrative-on the heterogeneous and challenges the very possibility of meta-narrative. See, e.g.,
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDrION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE, at
xxiii-xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. Minn. Press 1984) (1979)
(criticizing appeals "to some grand narrative, such as... the hermeneutics of meaning" and
arguing instead for an "incredulity toward metanarratives"). In other work I have examined the
Derridean objections to Ricoeur's hermeneutics and argued that Derrida's portrayal
inappropriately reduces the complexity of Ricoeur's project. See George H. Taylor, Justice As
Postmodern? (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For Ricoeur, narrative does
not subsume discordance, but rather presents a "dialectic between discordance and
concordance." RICOEUR, supra note 14, at 161. I return to this point later in this Article. See
infra note 97 and accompanying text.
17. I reserve to Part III a brief evaluation of Judge Posner's claim that his pragmatic
approach is anti-interpretive in its valuation of attention to the potential consequences of
judicial decision making in a particular case. See infra Part III.
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nation" than nomological explanation, explanation by "law." Mayr's

work also provides a useful counterpoint to Posner, who invokes
evolutionary biology as a more nomological form of explanation. My
thesis, then, is that there is a fundamental dialectic between understanding and explanation: each lies at the heart of the other. 18
I
My first object is to examine the work of legal thinkers most
closely identified with an interpretive stance that could stereotypically
be described as one of "understanding." Authors such as Robert
Bork and Justice Scalia define their interpretive approaches as ones

that emphasize fidelity to the authors of the Constitution or statutory
texts. They reject that readers of these texts-e.g., judges-should
have a role in contributing to these texts' meaning; deference must be
paid to the authors. Bork indeed calls his approach one of "original
understanding.' ' 19 Originalism might seem to represent some of the

virtues commonly associated with hermeneutic understanding: it
emphasizes the importance of hearing the other, 20 rather than
imposing one's own views on the other. Yet consider Bork's analysis
of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.2 1

Bork famously rejects the Court's reasoning yet agrees with the
Court's result.22 Bork maintains that the Court's conclusion that
segregated education is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be defended-and must
only be defended-on the basis of an originalist methodology. 23 How,

18. To be more precise, I argue that the dialectic exists within the disciplinary areas
analyzed. I do not enter into the debate over the "objectivity" of the "hard" natural sciences
such as physics. See, e.g., ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE:
POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998). The impetus for the book was a
Sokal article that seemed to argue that the natural sciences are a social construction; however,
later Sokal showed the article be a parody of that position. See Alan Sokal, Transgressingthe
Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 SOCIAL TEXT
217 (1996), reprinted in SOKAL & BRICMONT, supra, at 212. The book develops the critique of
the social constructivist position. For our purposes, it is perhaps revealing of the current
distortions of the term hermeneutics that Sokal included it so readily in his parody title.
19. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 143 (1990) ("[O]nly the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that any
theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy. Only
that approach is consonant with the design of the American Republic.").
20. See, e.g., GADAMER, supra note 7, at 462 ("[T]he primacy of hearing is the basis of the
hermeneutical phenomenon .....
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. See BORK, supra note 19, at 75.
23. See id. at 82-83.
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as a matter of the original "understanding," can the Court's
conclusion be correct, though, when Bork also acknowledges that it is
an "inescapable fact. . . that those who ratified the [fourteenth]
amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or

segregation in any aspect of life"? 24 How can an originalist square

this "inescapable fact" with the result in Brown? For Bork, the
original understanding requires a focus not on original intent-what
the framers subjectively thought-but on original meaning-what did

they put into the constitutional text. "The purpose that brought the
fourteenth amendment into being was equality before the law, and

equality, not separation, was written into the text. '25 Because the
framers put equality into the text, and the concept of equality
requires desegregation, it does not matter that the framers may have
subjectively understood something different by the term. What was

enacted was the text, not the framers' intent.
This differentiation between meaning and text is echoed in the
In his recent book, A Matter of
work of Justice Scalia. 26
Interpretation,27 Scalia writes that "despite frequent statements to the
contrary, we do not really look for subjective legislative intent. We

look for a sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text of the law .... "28 Later in the
24. Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added). Acceptance of this proposition is not universal. In part
to counter the difficulties raised by Bork's position, Michael McConnell strenuously argues that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did think it prohibited segregated education. See
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947
(1995). McConnell's argument is itself the subject of vigorous response. See, e.g., Michael J.
Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell,
81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions-A
Response to ProfessorMcConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (1996). McConnell responds to
Klarman in Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to
Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995). For my purposes it does not matter whether
McConnell is "correct" (which I do not think he is). More important is that his interpretive
stance is not endorsed by such important originalist methodological thinkers as Bork and Justice
Scalia.
25. BORK, supra note 19, at 82.
26. In emphasizing the commonality here of Bork and Scalia, I am aware of but simply set
aside as secondary their differences. For exploration of their differences, compare Ollman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) (permitting the
evolution in application of a constitutional principle), with id. at 1036, 1038 n.2 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) (criticizing sharply any "alteration of preexisting principles"). In The
Tempting of America, Bork defends and quotes at length his Ollman concurring opinion. See
BORK, supra note 19, at 167-70.
27. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW

(1997).

28. Id. at 17. The specific context of Scalia's remark is statutory interpretation. He later
comments similarly about constitutional interpretation: "What I look for in the Constitution is
precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original
draftsmen intended." Id. at 38.
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book, Scalia indicates that his approach holds in common with
Ronald Dworkin's that both follow the "semantic intention" of a text
rather than "the concrete expectations of lawgivers. ' 29 Scalia (and
Bork) differ with Dworkin in adhering to an "originalist"
understanding of textual meaning while Dworkin permits meaning to
evolve, but it is extraordinary to see even this level of interpretive
commonality between such otherwise diverse figures.
Elsewhere I consider at greater length the implications for legal
interpretation of this commonality across diverse approaches.3 0 What
is remarkable for present purposes is the separation, internal to a
conservative legal methodology, between different kinds of meaning.
Even within conservative approaches, "understanding" is not simply
passive recognition of and adherence to an unambiguous datumauthorial meaning-because authorial meaning can be interpreted in
diverse ways. Further, once loosened from the notion of specific
authorial intent-that is, from particular results or entailments that an
author allegedly had in mind-the boundaries and delimitations of
meaning are not self-evident. Scalia, Bork, and Dworkin all
concentrate on textual meaning, but they can derive quite different
meanings from the same text.31 "Understanding" does not derive
from some allegedly unambiguous "fact"-subjective authorial
intentions.
Understanding is rather separable from subjective
authorial intention; it is a construct that requires an argument and a
theory. It includes an element of explanation, of methodology
(whether nomological or not) imposed upon the text. Explanation
lies at the core of understanding
The separation in such figures as Bork and Scalia between
subjective authorial intention and textual meaning provides some
confirmation of the fundamental interrelation between understanding
and explanation. My larger claim is that this interrelation is
fundamental throughout hermeneutics, not just legal hermeneutics. It
is instructive for this larger claim that the separation in legal analysis
between subjective authorial intention and textual meaning echoes a
similar separation found in the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and
29. Id. at 144.
30. See GEORGE H. TAYLOR, THE DYNAMISM IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION (forthcoming).
31. As I analyze in my book, see id., once meaning is cut from a supposed anchor in
subjective intent, interpretation opens itself to the problem of generality. On what textual
grounds, for example, do we delimit whether the concept of equality in the Fourteenth
Amendment entails protection for black people, for other racial minorities, for women, or for
gays and lesbians? See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990) (developing the problem).
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Gadamer. 31 Gadamer, for example, criticizes Friederich Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, which saw interpretation as a "divinatory
process" by which the gap between author and interpreter is
overcome. 33 Gadamer argues instead: "To understand what a person
says is ...to come to an understanding about the subject matter, not

to get inside another person and relive his experiences ....
Ricoeur concurs, maintaining that understanding is "never a direct
intuition but always a reconstruction. ' 3 Expanding on some of my
earlier comments about Ricoeur, it seems to me that among his
central contributions to hermeneutic analysis is his attention to the
fact that interpretation is a reconstruction. This emphasis is
highlighted in Ricoeur's preoccupation with hermeneutics as the
interpretation of texts. The better exemplar for hermeneutics is not
face-to-face dialogue but interpretation of a text. "[T]he text.., is
the paradigm of distanciation in communication.... [I]t is communication in and through distance. 36 Interpretation is not the
unmediated meeting of subject and subject; it is inevitably mediated
by signs and texts. Elsewhere, Ricoeur makes it plain that he
understands his theory to apply not only to linguistic texts but to the
37
textuality of action and history as well.
Exploration of the role of explanation-of distance, of reconstruction-at the core of understanding requires one final point.
Once we loosen interpretation from the supposed datum of subjective
authorial intention, once interpretation becomes interpretation of
texts, then hermeneutics loses priority as the proper method of text
interpretation. There may now be different ways to analyze what is at
work in the text, and hermeneutics is only one of them. This has at
least two consequences. Hermeneutics itself can attempt to interpret
a work (or body of work) to make it say what it does not want to,
something other than its "intentions."
Hermeneutics does not
32. In another work I explore in more detail the affinity here between hermeneutics and
legal interpretation and contrast this affinity to the more subjectively oriented hermeneutics of
Friederich Schleiermacher. See George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321,
327-29 (1995).
33. See GADAMER, supra note 7, at 193 (characterizing Schleiermacher's hermeneutics).
34. Id. at 383; see also id. at 311, 333.
35. RICOEUR, supra note 14, at 97.
36. PAUL RICOEUR, The HermeneuticalFunction of Distanciation,in HERMENEUTICS AND
THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 9, at 131. Interestingly, on the page from which this excerpt
is taken, Ricoeur objects to Gadamer's division between truth and method; Ricoeur wants to
maintain their relation. Again, it seems Ricoeur is more attentive than Gadamer to the
interconnection between understanding and explanation.
37. See, e.g., RICOEUR, Explanation and Understanding,supra note 10.
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passively accept any perspective a text purports to put forth; it has its
own interpretive agenda, its own goals for what it looks for in a text.
In his analysis of Freud, for example, Ricoeur tries to show that
internal to Freud's hermeneutic of "suspicion"38-its uncovering of

the unconscious-is another hermeneutics that permits a restoration
of meaning.39 This interpretation of Freud may be just as little or just

as much an imposition on Freud's texts as the hermeneutics of
suspicion are imposed on the texts they analyze. 40 Hermeneutics has
its own model of interpretive explanation/understanding. Second and
correlatively, other interpretive approaches have their own model of
explanation/understanding and when done well-which, as with

hermeneutics, is a matter of judgment, argument, and persuasionhave their own viability. In this sense, deconstruction, to take
another example, also tries to establish what is at work in the text.
Hermeneutics does contain elements of explanation within its larger
model of "understanding"; 41 it does not rest on understanding alone,

and in its interrelation of explanation with "understanding" shares
this interrelation -this effort to analyze what is at work in the textwith other interpretive approaches.
II

In this Part, I reverse emphases and attempt to show how
elements of "understanding" pervade "explanation." My example is
work of Judge Richard Posner. In his recent book, The Problematics

38. See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 32-36
(Denis Savage trans., 1970).
39. See, e.g., id. at 551. Ricoeur takes a similar interpretive tack when he analyzes Marx,
another master of suspicion, id. at 32, and his theory of ideology. See RICOEUR, LECTURES ON
IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra note 9, at 21-102.
40. Ricoeur is certainly aware of this tension in his approach. At the end of his second
lecture on Weber-whose details I set aside-Ricoeur comments:
Some may claim that my reading of Weber, just as my reading of Marx, does violence
to his text. By doing apparent violence to Marx, though, I think that I actually
succeeded in reading The German Ideology better.... [M]y own stance is that this
reading recognizes a dimension of the text. In fact, I would claim to have done more
violence to Weber than to Marx. I forced Weber, I compelled him to say what he did
not want to say: that it is through some ideological process that we take hold of our
own motivation in relation to power.
Id. at 214-15.
41. In fact, Ricoeur's model attempts to incorporate not only its own "explanatory" model
but as well other models of "explanation," such as the hermeneutics of suspicion. As I have
argued elsewhere, if Ricoeur's hermeneutics has any advantage here over these other
interpretive models, it is that it can incorporate their insights, while it is open to question
whether they can incorporate Ricoeur, or at least a sophisticated account of Ricoeur. See
TAYLOR, supra note 16 (discussing the example of deconstruction).
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of Moral and Legal Theory, 42 Posner has a two-fold objective. He
wants to dismiss the relevance of academic moral theory to
particularized decisionmaking, including legal decision making4 3-a
subject I return to in Part 111-and he wants to proffer the relevance
of the social sciences" in the alternative. The pragmatic approach
that Posner endorses believes
that intuition and opinion and the rest can sometimes be educated
by immersion in "the facts." I have put this term between
quotation marks to signal that it is to bear a wider meaning than in
the law of evidence. It is a sense that takes in the analytic methods,
empirical techniques, and findings of the social sciences (including
history). In broadest terms, then, and with some exaggeration as
we shall see, this book asks whether, when the methods of legal
positivism fail to yield a satisfactory resolution of a legal issue, the
law should take its bearings
from philosophy or from science. And
''45
it answers, "from science.
The nature of Judge Posner's reliance on social science is
somewhat ambiguous. At times it seems that the social sciences can
provide the "right answer" to a legal question. In Posner's view, for
example, antitrust law "has become a branch of applied economics,
has achieved a high degree of rationality and predictability, and is a
success story of which all branches of the law and allied disciplines
can be proud." 4 Elsewhere are statements that "the only sound basis
for a legal rule is its social advantage, which requires an economic
judgment, balancing benefits against costs. ' 47 At other junctures,
though, Judge Posner's claims about the social sciences are more
modulated. Economists, he writes, can estimate the private benefits
and social costs of a policy, but it is left to others to determine "how
'48
much weight to give costs and benefits as a matter of social justice.
My concern, using Judge Posner's work as a vehicle, is to explore
whether the social sciences allow legal issues to be decided simply on
42. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
43. Posner writes:
[Mioral theorizing does not provide a usable basis for moral judgments (such as
"abortion is bad" or "redistributing wealth from rich to poor is good") .... [E]ven if
moral theorizing can provide a usable basis for some moral judgments, it should not be
used for making legal judgments.... [I]t does not mesh with the issues in legal cases.
Id. at 3.
44. As noted earlier, supra note 18, I basically restrict my attention to the social sciences
also, although in Part IV, I make reference to evolutionary biology.
45. POSNER, supra note 42, at viii.
46. Id. at 229. It would be interesting to know whether Judge Posner's immersion in the
Microsoft antitrust case has modified his views.
47. Id. at 208.
48. Id. at 47.
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the basis of social scientific explanation, or whether these explanations are themselves contestable both internally and on application
and so permeated at both levels by issues of interpretive
understanding. Let me take the following two statements by Judge
Posner as a guide. In Overcoming Law, Posner writes that the
scientist acts
not as the discoverer of the ultimate truths about the universetruths that once discovered by the experts should be forced on the
rest of us-but as the exposer of falsehoods, who seeks to narrow
the area of human uncertainty by
49 generating falsifiable hypotheses
and confronting them with data.
In his more recent book, Judge Posner expresses disdain for the
expression of legal claims by moral and constitutional theory, whose
vocabulary is "opaque and spongy," and advocates instead legal
claims' conception in scientific terms, "for legal claims might then
actually be falsifiable. '' 5° The tasks of the social sciences here are
more modest: not ultimate truth but falsifiability. Nevertheless, the
issue is whether legal issues are resolvable on social scientific grounds
alone or whether social scientific inquiry itself requires interpretive
resolution and application, which are matters of argument and
persuasion. My thesis here is that social scientific explanation does
not have the status of fact, which can stand alone, but must be
integrated within larger interpretive stories. My thesis contests not
the value but the sufficiency of attention to social scientific insight.5'
I take as suggestive of Judge Posner's stance his response to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia12 There, the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, held that it was
49. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 6 (1995).
50. POSNER, supra note 42, at 204.
51. I therefore levy on hermeneutic grounds a critique of Judge Posner that resonates with
criticisms others have advanced as well. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica
Lewinsky, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, March 9, 2000, at 48, 51 (reviewing POSNER, supra note 42)
(arguing that when Judge Posner's pragmatic judge tries to determine whether one set of
projected consequences is better than another, this determination must rest on moral or political
principles); Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1447, 1461 (1990) (noting that law and economics principles such as wealth maximization
are themselves dependent on "controversial visions of the way the world is or should be"). I set
aside the differences between Fish and Dworkin. As I shall describe infra notes 91-100, 115 and
accompanying text, Posner is aware of these criticisms and has attempted-though neither fully
nor quite successfully-to integrate them in revisions of his own position.
52. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). For a separate discussion of Posner's assessment of this decision,
see Deborah Jones Merritt, ConstitutionalFact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge Posner,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1287 (1999) (endorsing the role of empiricism in constitutional law but
criticizing Posner for trying to replace constitutional theory with empiricism). Professor Merritt
is replying to one of Judge Posner's articles later incorporated into his Problematicsbook. See
Richard A. Posner, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment for the Virginia
Military Institute ("VMI") to refuse to admit women.53 VMI had
claimed that the admission of women would eliminate its ability to
maintain an "adversative" program of education, a program
physically and psychologically stressful, intense, and invasive.5 4 For
Judge Posner, the VMI decision is a most apt representative of the
kind of constitutional thinking he is arguing against. The issue is not
the result but that the decision is "so barren of any engagement with
reality that the issue of [its] correctness scarcely arises. The Achilles'
heel of constitutional law is the lack of an empirical footing, not the
lack of a good constitutional theory."55
What are the specific problems with the majority decision?
Posner reads the opinion as supposing that the only major differences
between men and women are physical and that these distinctions
make no education-related differences. This is most inadequate, he
claims.
Once the advance of science is conceded, it becomes appropriate to
observe that, like many articles of faith, the "no difference" claim is
contradicted by modern science. Modem science teaches that
along with the obvious physical differences there are inherent
psychologicaldifferences between the average man and the average
woman, differences with respect to aggressiveness, competitiveness,
the propensity to take risks, and the propensity to resort to
violence. These are differences that, along with the acknowledged
differences in physical strength, 56bear on military fitness and
performance, especially in combat.
So the Court is not being scientific in its refusal to face these facts.
But compare the Court's presentation. The issue for the Court is not
whether women in general would choose to attend VMI but whether
the school can lawfully deny admission to those women "who have
the will and capacity."57 In contrast to the generalizations about
women on which VMI rests, the Court notes the following findings of
fact made by the lower courts: "'some women, at least, would want to
attend [VMI] if they had the opportunity' and "'some women are
58
capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets.'

53. For Judge Posner's major discussion of the case, see POSNER, supra note 42, at 165-73.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549 (describing the adversative
approach).
55. POSNER, supra note 42, at 182.
56. Id. at 167 (footnote omitted).
57. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
58. Id. at 550 (citations omitted).
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For the Court the relevant social scientific issue is not the capacity of
all women or the average woman but of some women.
Judge Posner acknowledges that some women may be able to
perform well at VM15 9 but then switches critical bases and argues that
this fact is unrelated to whether the adversative program can be
maintained when women are mixed with men. 60 The ultimate issue
for Posner, then, is whether the exclusion of women from VMI does
more harm to women than their entrance would do the school's
adversative educational program. The harm to women, he argues, is
slight, 61 and "the Court had no basis either theoretical or empirical for
thinking that the admission of women would not impair VMI's
educational program disproportionately to the slight harm to women
'62
of being excluded from the school.
Judge Posner thinks throughout at the level of generalities, while
the Court wants to protect the rights of individuals. Contrary to
Judge Posner's statements, the Court does assess the empirical
realities of women's capabilities and finds that some women can
satisfy VMI's requirements. The Court holds that there is harm done
to women by exclusion and that VMI has not shown that admission of
women will adversely affect the school's ability to maintain an
adversative education. 63 Admittedly, the Court does treat briefly the
claim that the admission of women would require some alteration of
VMI's program. 64 Its finding that these adjustments are "manageable" 65 does not directly respond to the claim that the adjustments
diminish adversative education. The Court seems to rest on the fact
that similar claims were made and subsequently laid to rest in other
forms of education, including the admission of women to law school,
medical school, and the federal military academies. 66 My sense is that
the Court is taking the "experimental" stance that Judge Posner
otherwise advocates 67 and saying to VMI: "You haven't proven a
59. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 167.
60. See id.
61. The harm, he says, is the difference between a VMI education and an alternative
created by the state elsewhere, multiplied by the small percentage of women who would want to
attend VMI. See id. at 171. Earlier, Posner recognizes exclusion may have some symbolic value
but finds it a "laughable suggestion" that women's equal status depends in any degree on their
admission to VMI. See id. at 169.
62. Id. at 171.
63. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
64. See id. at 540, 550 n.19.
65. Id. at 550 n.19.
66. See id. at 542-45.
67. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 254-55. Judge Posner elsewhere states:
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harmful effect, so you are required to admit women. Evidence from
the past suggests your fears about the effects of their admission on
adversative education will be unfounded, but if necessary we can

revisit the issue again when you have experience with actual
evidence."68 In the absence of sufficient proof of harm to the school,
the proper default position is that admission of women should go

forward.6 9
The majority opinion's treatment of social scientific evidence is
intriguing on at least two grounds. First, the Court is skeptical about
what the social sciences claim to show. On many occasions in the
past, the social sciences have asserted-wrongly-that various forms
of education would have adverse effects on women.70 The social

sciences proceed not on the basis of explanation alone-here,
empirical "evidence"-but must integrate that evidence into
interpretive theories of understanding that may well be incorrect or
contested. Second, even if the present social scientific evidenceabout average physiological and psychological differences between
men and women-is accepted, it can be integrated into and applied

by diverse forms of interpretive understanding.

At this level, the

debate is not between Judge Posner as defender of science and the
A pragmatic judge .... need not have faith in any particular bodies of data as guides to
making the decision that will best serve the future.... The less one thinks one knows
the answers to difficult questions of policy, the more inclined one will be to encourage
learning about them through experimentation and other methods of inquiry.
Id. at 248.
68. The difference, then, would be between a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
VMI as a single-sex institution and a challenge as applied, once the real impact of women on
VMI's adversative educational process becomes more apparent. This incrementalist agenda
seems consistent with larger themes in Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence. See, e.g., CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
The evidence since women's admission to VMI suggests that some women are indeed
succeeding at the school. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Two Cheers for Cheerleading: The Noisy
Integration of VMI and the Quiet Success of Virginia Women in Leadership, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 347 (documenting the successes of women both at VMI and in the alternative
program set up at Mary Baldwin College, the Virginia Women in Leadership program of Case's
title). More recent newspaper accounts indicate a woman in the first co-ed VMI class has just
been named one of the two student "battalion commanders" for her senior year and in that
position will lead half the student body. According to the school, she was "the best-qualified
candidate in terms of grades, leadership ability and physical fitness." John Bacon, Military
School Gets 1st Female Leader, USA TODAY, March 24, 2000, at 3A.
It remains a separate issue whether VMI's admission of women has led to any diminution
in its adversative educational program. Case provides evidence that women are being treated
equally harshly as men, see Case, supra, at 374-75, and that individual program changes were not
an accommodation to women, see id. at 373. Additional evidence would be necessary, though,
to document the effect on VMI's adversative approach more generally.
69. It is, of course, also an entirely separate issue whether VMI's education is normatively
desirable. For Case's comparison of VMI and Virginia Women in Leadership, see id. at 378-79.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 n.9 (citing evidence).
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Court but between different interpretations of science. As Judge
Posner elsewhere acknowledges, it is inadequate to claim to rest
simply on the "facts"-on empirical explanation-for the facts must
be fit into an "analytic framework" 7 1-into interpretive understanding. Judge Posner's emphasis on empirical generalities is not
required as a matter of science.7 2 As he also acknowledges at points,
his predisposition toward generalities fits the facts within his
preferred analytic framework of utilitarianism, which he accepts is
itself a contestable form of understanding. 73 Explanation must be
contextualized within interpretive understanding.
III
If Parts I and II have argued that understanding and explanation
each pervade the other, this Part argues how this interrelationship
may be recast. I again want to use Judge Posner's work as a point of
entry.
In his more subtle moments, Judge Posner has launched criticism
of both "top down" and "bottom up" legal reasoning. 74 Top down
approaches-Judge Posner uses Ronald Dworkin's as exemplarbegin in general theory and argue it is possible to generate outcomes
in specific legal cases on the basis of the theory. 75 Bottom up
approaches begin with the particular, such as individual cases, and
argue that outcomes in subsequent cases can be generated by
induction-through processes such as analogy.7 6 Over the course of
his work, Posner has criticized bottom up reasoning at several
junctures, 77 and his recent book, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal
Theory," is an extended critique principally of top down approaches
but also of bottom up theories. Posner finds neither approach
persuasive. We never start simply from cases as the bottom up
approach would suggest; we can read and interpret them only on the
71. POSNER, supra note 42, at 145-46.
72. As with VMI, then, it is not necessarily the case that "we are naturally more interested
in typical than in exceptional situations." Id. at 180. In Part IV, I return to this point and show
that it is a mistake to believe that science itself necessarily concentrates on generalities.
73. See POSNER, supra note 42, at xii-xiii.
74. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 49, at 171-97.
75. See id. at 172-73.
76. See id. at 173-75.
77. In addition to his Legal Reasoning chapter, supra note 74, see, for example, RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86-98 (1990); POSNER, supra note 49, at 518-

24.
78. POSNER, supra note 42.
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basis of a larger "linguistic, cultural, and conceptual apparatus," and
we can argue for the propriety of an analogy from one case to another
also only on the basis of a larger theory. 9 Top down approaches in
turn provide a general theory, but the ineluctability of choosing one
theory over another is questionable, as is the claim that particular
results follow deductively from the larger theory. 80 Further, and a
principal argument in Judge Posner's new book, neither approach
8
convinces anyone not already predisposed to the view advocated.
As we have already anticipated, Posner's approach is pragmatic: "a
disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences
rather than on conceptualisms and generalities." 82
In Part II, I noted that I certainly do not object to the value of
empirical inquiry but argued there that empirical inquiry is
insufficient on its own. The explanatory mode of analysis must be
reincorporated within a larger mode of interpretive understanding.
In this Part, I want to explain how that can occur, while integrating
Judge Posner's criticisms of top down and bottom up interpretive
approaches. My thesis here is that hermeneutic analysis both agrees
with and provides accommodation for the kinds of criticisms Judge
Posner levies. Since I expect my presentation of hermeneutics on this
point is rather familiar, I will be brief.
As is well-known, hermeneutics does not provide a "manual for
guiding understanding" or "a system of rules to describe, let alone
83
direct, the methodical procedure of the human sciences.
Hermeneutics operates at a more fundamental level; it seeks to
ascertain and clarify the very "conditions in which understanding
takes place." 84 These conditions are most fruitfully revealed in
considering the inextricability of application to understanding. 8
What, then, does application mean? Application may be usefully
79. POSNER,supra note 49, at 174-75.
80. See, e.g., id. at 187-88 (criticizing Dworkin).
81. Judge Posner states:
[A]fter more than two centuries no signs of closure [in constitutional theory] are
visible, or even, as it seems to me, of progress. The reason is that constitutional theory
has no power to command agreement from people not already predisposed to accept
the theorist's policy prescriptions. This is because it is normative in the same way that
moral theory is, being abstract, unempirical, and often at war with strongly held moral
intuitions or political commitments ....
POSNER,supra note 42, at 145.
82. Id. at 227.
83. GADAMER,supra note 7, at xxviii.
84. Id. at 295.
85. See id. at 324 ("[Alpplication is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of
the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning.").
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contextualized by contemplating it as an aspect of the hermeneutic
circle: "that we must understand the whole in terms of the detail and
the detail in terms of the whole.... The anticipation of meaning in
which the whole is envisaged becomes actual understanding when the
parts that are determined by the whole themselves also determine this
whole.186 Hermeneutics rejects a notion of application whereby
meaning is first known in its universal form and then rendered
concrete in-applied to-a particular case.87 Hermeneutics argues
that application does not follow behind understanding but rather
provides understanding.
Application involves "co-determining,
supplementing, and correcting [a] principle." 88 As Joel Weinsheimer
explains:
In order to explain how application alters and expands understanding, we need a dialectical conception of the relation between
the particular and the general. Neither induction nor deduction
explains how concepts are formed and understanding is furthered,
because both are hierarchical and unidirectional: they proceed
either from the "lower" particular to the "higher" general or vice
versa, but not both. Understanding is furthered in application,
however, only if neither the rule nor the instance to which it is
applied is antecedent to the other. The act of conjunction that
advances understanding can still be called application so long as we
conceive of application as reciprocal rather than unilateral.
Each
89
term modifies and acts on the other so that they interact.
In its interconnection of whole and part, hermeneutics operates as
both a top down approach going from whole to part and a bottom up
approach going from part to whole but goes beyond each in
recognizing their reciprocity and mutual import.
In my view, we can recast the interrelation of understanding and
explanation as the basis for the act of application. The relationship
between understanding and explanation itself forms a hermeneutic
circle: understanding is mediated by explanatory procedures, and
explanation needs contextualization within interpretive understanding. 90 This interrelation, as with the interrelation of whole and
part, is not automatic or pre-cast.
86. Id. at 291.
87. See id. at 341.
88. Id. at 39.
89. JOEL WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY 80

(1991); see also JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH
AND METHOD 192 (1985) ("[T]he general is not a pre-given universal that could be pre-known,
because it is continually determined by the particular, even as it determines the particular.
Application is not reductive but productive ....).
90. See RICOEUR, The Model of the Text, supra note 10, at 220-21.
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Is this presentation of hermeneutics responsive to Judge Posner's
critique of top down and bottom up approaches? Yes. Neither the
movement from theory to case nor case to theory is sufficient. At the
moment of application each implicates and informs the other. The
act of application requires judgment. "[N]o learned and mastered

technique," neither top down nor bottom up, "can spare us the task of
deliberation and decision." 91 Both Judge Posner and hermeneutics
have emphasized the role of practical reason; 92 both reject founda-

tional interpretive methods. The approach of neither is algorithmic.
Judge Posner notes of his advocacy of pragmatism, for instance, that

"[p]ragmatism is a method, approach, or attitude, not a moral, legal,
or political algorithm, so it will not resolve any moral or legal
disagreement."'

93

Judge Posner's pragmatism rests more in the social

sciences, while hermeneutics rests more in philosophy, but there can
be degrees of accommodation at this level too. Judge Posner's
emphasis on social science insight is salutary; in the vocabulary I have

used, it requires encompassing "explanatory" modalities within the
world of understanding. Similarly, as discussed in Part II, when
Posner overemphasizes reliance on the social sciences, hermeneutics
argues that social scientific insight rests on and must be reintegrated

within a larger interpretive understanding, as Posner at his best
acknowledges. 94 Differences do remain. Judge Posner's pragmatism
is more instrumental in orientation and less concerned about ties to
the past,95 while hermeneutics emphasizes the effect of tradition on an
interpreter. 96 But even this disparity, which I can touch upon only
briefly, can be overdrawn. Just as Ricoeur conceives of narrative as a
"dialectic between discordance and concordance,"' 97 so he also

91. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Hermeneutics As PracticalPhilosophy, in REASON IN THE
AGE OF SCIENCE 88,92 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1981) (1979).
92. See, e.g., id.; POSNER, supra note 77, at 71-100.
93. POSNER, supra note 42, at xii.
94. See, e.g., id. at 145-46 ("Of course, just getting the facts right can't decide a case; there
has to be an analytic framework to fit the facts into.").
95. See, e.g., id. at 241 (claiming that the pragmatist judge "is concerned with securing
consistency with the past only to the extent that deciding in accordance with precedent may be
the best method for producing the best results for the future").
96. See, e.g., GADAMER, supra note 7, at 300 ("[H]istorical consciousness is itself situated
in the web of historical effects."). This emphasis on tradition was one source of the debate
between Gadamer and Habermas. See, e.g., RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA,
supra note 9, at 236 (noting this point). As the text goes on to point out and as earlier discussion
of the interrelation of explanation and understanding emphasized, Ricoeur attempts to integrate
and transcend this debate.
97. RICOEUR, supra note 14, at 161.
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conceives of tradition as "the interplay of innovation and
98
sedimentation.
Let me close this Part by comparing Judge Posner's assessment
of hermeneutics with his evaluation of pragmatism. First, Judge
Posner criticizes hermeneutics:
The problem of interpretation, after all, is not that people don't
know how to read carefully and with due allowance for cultural
distance; the problem is that there are no techniques for generating
objective interpretations of difficult texts. Hermeneutics poses the
problem; it does not offer a solution. It is neither the salvation of
legal interpretation nor the annunciator of its doom. Hermeneutics
will not teach you how to interpret the Eighth Amendment or the
Sherman Act. It will not even tell you whether to construe legal
texts broadly or to hew close to the surface meaning. That is a
political judgment. 99
Next, Judge Posner defines pragmatism:
All that a pragmatist jurisprudence really connotes.., is a rejection
of the idea that law is something grounded in permanent principles
and realized in logical manipulations of those principles, and a
determination to use law as an instrument for social ends. If it
plants no trees, this pragmatic jurisprudence that I have been
defending, at least it clears away a lot of underbrush. It signals an
attitude, an orientation, at times a change in direction. That is
something, and maybe a lot.1°°
It is true that adoption of a hermeneutic approach does not mandate
or endorse any particular interpretive strategy. It is also true that it
requires a political-or political, normative, or legal-judgment to
decide both what interpretive approach to apply and how it should
apply in a particular case. But these are not hermeneutic failures;
these are hermeneutic insights. Hermeneutics itself "clears away a lot
of underbrush."
Hermeneutics rejects the claimed availability of simple top down
or bottom up approaches: their alleged ability to begin in some
facticity-an overarching principle or individual cases-and maneuver by "logical manipulations" to some defined end. Instead,
hermeneutics argues, interpretation does not begin in facticity, and its
process of application is a matter of judgment at each stage, all the
way down. Similarly, hermeneutics rejects the Judge Posner who
advocates that if the law is to choose to take bearings from science or

98. Id. at 68.
99. POSNER, supra note 77, at 298.
100. POSNER, supra note 49, at 405.
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philosophy, it should choose science 1°'- a claim for the availability of
a different form of facticity. Science, or explanation, exists only
within larger forms of understanding, of interpretation. Thus, if
hermeneutics agrees with Judge Posner's challenge to (much)
academic moral theorizing, 102 it does not do so to diminish but to exalt
moral and political questions and to exalt, examine, and reflect upon
the role of judgment throughout. 10'
Like Posner's claim for
pragmatism, hermeneutics itself "signals an attitude, an orientation,
1°4
at times a change in direction. That is something, and maybe a lot."
I would say quite a lot.
IV
In this concluding Part, I want to entertain one last turn in our
evaluation of the interrelation between understanding and explanation. In the prior Parts, I have argued that explanation cannot rest
in isolation from but must be integrated within interpretive
understanding. The limitation of this stance is that it may seem to
indicate that explanation remains pure-purely empirical and purely
scientific-on its own terms. It may also intimate that finally a chasm
remains between understanding (interpretation) and explanation
(science): the processes are fundamentally different. In this Part, I
contend instead that evidence from the sciences-to be more precise,
evidence from an evolutionary biologist's assessment of the
methodology in his own science-suggests that interpretation lies at
the heart of this scientific methodology as well.
This inquiry is framed by the quotation from Clifford Geertz
with which this Article began. For Geertz, recall, the interpretive
turn in the social sciences led away from "an experimental science in
101. See POSNER, supra note 42, at viii.
102. See id. at 3.
103. I therefore agree with Robin West when she argues that in law we should take moral
argument seriously. See Robin West, Taking Moral Argument Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
499 (1999). My objection would be to West's following claim:
[T]he demonstrable indeterminacy of legal texts obviously does not imply that legal
conclusions are also indeterminate; it implies only that if those conclusions are
determined, then something other than the legal texts themselves are doing the
determining.... [O]ne possible determinant of outcomes... is that legal conclusions.., are determined ... as interpreted through the lens of some specified
conception of political or legal justice.
Id. at 506. This seems to grant that a conception of justice leads, by its own terms, to
determinate conclusions rather than that application remains a matter of judgment. In my view,
human choice enters not only at the point of origin-the choice of which conception of justicebut at the points of application. I explore this point at greater length in TAYLOR, supra note 30.
104. POSNER, supra note 49, at 405.
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search of law" to "an interpretive one in search of meaning."'' 5 As
throughout, my question is whether the two sides are as far apart as it
might seem. More particularly, in this Part, I ask whether evolutionary biology provides us the example of an "experimental science"
that is not in search of "law"-of uniform, determinative explanation-but includes interpretation within its own terms. The
horizon of this inquiry, again as throughout, is whether in the legal
domain the loss of "law"-the uniform, determinative form of top
down or bottom up explanation criticized in Part III -nevertheless
permits a revitalized notion of law that can incorporate, as does
biology, both interpretive and explanatory elements. I will exemplify
this point by one last reference to Judge Posner's work.
The prominent evolutionary biologist, Ernst Mayr,'10 6 maintains
that biology is quite different from the physical sciences. While the
physical sciences are guided by ideas of "essentialism, determinism,
universalism, and reductionism," biology is informed by "population
thinking, probability, chance, pluralism, emergence, and historical
narratives." 107
What is the basis for the difference? Precisely that evolutionary
biology is predicated upon "population thinking": "[T]he variation
from individual to individual within the population is the reality of
nature, whereas the mean value (the 'type') is only a statistical
abstraction."1 0 8 Nature presents no types or essences. 10 9 Population
thinking stresses uniqueness.
All organisms and organic phenomena are composed of unique
features and can be described collectively only in statistical terms.
Individuals, or any kind of organic entities, form populations of
which we can determine only the arithmetic mean and the statistics
of variation. Averages are merely statistical abstractions; only the
individuals of which the populations are composed have reality.
The ultimate conclusions of the population thinker and of the
typologist are precisely the opposite. For the typologist, the type
(eidos) is real and the variation an illusion, while for the
populationist the type (average) is an abstraction and only the
variation is real. No two ways of looking at nature could be more
different. 110
105. GEERTZ, supra note 2, at 5.
106. Stephen Jay Gould calls Mayr "our greatest living evolutionist."
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GOULD, FULL HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF EXCELLENCE FROM PLATO TO DARWIN 41 (1996).
107. ERNST MAYR, THIS Is BIOLOGY, at xiii (1997).
108. ERNST MAYR, TOWARD A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: OBSERVATIONS OF AN

EVOLUTIONIST 15 (1988).
109. See MAYR, supra note 107, at 128.
110. ERNST MAYR, EVOLUTION AND
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What are the methodological consequences of Mayr's conception
of biology? While the physical sciences are governed by laws, biology
is not. Generalizations in biology are probabilistic: most biological
generalizations "have so limited an application that the use of the
word law, in the sense of the laws of physics, is questionable.""' For a
science concerned with the explanation of processes occurring in
time, the concept of law is much less helpful than the concept of
historical narratives.112 Mayr rejects the appeal to "causal-law
explanations" and finds that "the historical-narrative approach.., is
perhaps the only scientifically and philosophically valid approach in

the explanation of unique occurrences."'1 3 On its own terms, then,
there are different accounts of what it means to engage in science,
here biological science. Biological science is itself suffused with
interpretation: the challenge of integrating diverse facts into larger

narratives. The narrative approach in biology has more affinities with
interpretive methodologies in the social sciences than it might first
appear; the divide is not so great as formerly considered.
Let me close with the possible insights of this methodology for
law. First, even within a science such as biology, the divide is not

between interpretation and fact; the facts need integration within
larger narratives. Second, the contexts of biology and legal analysis
are similar in this regard: both locate themselves within the changing
face of history in specific contexts that are distinct and individual.
(1976). This theme is basic as well to Gould's book, Full House, supra note 106. Gould writes:
"I will argue that we are still suffering from a legacy as old as Plato, a tendency to abstract a
single ideal or average as the 'essence' of a system, and to devalue or ignore variation among the
individuals that constitute the full population." Id. at 40. Gould's thesis-and Mayr's-are
controversial. Elsewhere I locate Gould within a larger debate in evolutionary theory. See
TAYLOR, supra note 16. It is immaterial to my own thesis that Gould's and Mayr's theses have
drawn controversy. All I am suggesting is that their approaches form one sophisticated account
of current evolutionary theory and methodology.
111. MAYR, supra note 108, at 19 ("[T]he word law is used sparingly, if at all, in most
writings about evolution.... The so-called laws of biology are not the universal laws of classical
physics but are simply high-level generalizations."); see also id. at 189 (describing "the absence
or at least irrelevance of laws (as defined by the physicists) in evolutionary biology."); ERNST
MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE 37 (1982) [hereinafter MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT] (claiming that
to the extent there are regularities in biology, most "have occasional or frequent exceptions and
are only 'rules,' not universal laws. They are explanatory as far as past events are concerned,
but not predictive, except in a statistical (probabilistic) sense.").
112. See MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT, supra note 111, at 130.
113. MAYR, supra note 107, at 64. Mayr explains:
The biologist has to study all the known facts relating to the particular problem, infer
all sorts of consequences from the reconstructed constellation of factors, and then
attempt to construct a scenario that would explain the observed facts of this particular
case. In other words, he constructs a historical narrative.
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CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS

The model for law need not necessarily derive from the deterministic,

nomological form of explanation commonly identified in the physical
sciences but may find more appropriate analogue in the interrelation
of regularity and exception found in biology. A sophisticated
narrative approach-informed by both interpretive understanding
and explanation-can be an appropriate, indeed arguably is the most
appropriate, methodology in law. Finally, where the law seeks to be

informed by biological science as a form of explanation, the terms of
biological science themselves do not require attention only to

114 If
generality or average type; they permit recognition of variation.

both in his specific analysis of the Court's decision in VMI and often
in his general analysis elsewhere, Judge Posner appears more a legal
typologist than a population thinker, that is a product of his
interpretive framework."'
It is not a requirement of biological
science. The evidence of biology or of the social sciences permits
different legal stories to be told.
The interrelation between
understanding and explanation is basic to each: each lies at the heart
of the other.

114. It is important to maintain that biology permits recognition in law of biological
variation; it does not compel this recognition. Whatever the "facts" of biology may be, they do
not stand alone in law as forces of explanation; they must be incorporated within a larger
interpretive framework. It is a judgment of distinctively legal considerations that determines
whether biological variation shall be acknowledged or protected as a matter of law.
115. Judge Posner is often but not always an advocate of typological analysis. His judicial
pragmatism can be quite attentive to specific factual and legal contexts. For example, he writes:
Pragmatism in the sense that I find congenial means looking at problems concretely,
experimentally, without illusions, with full awareness of the limitations of human
reason, with a sense of the "localness" of human knowledge, the difficulty of translations between cultures, the unattainability of "truth," the consequent importance of
keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, the dependence of inquiry on culture and social
institutions, and above all the insistence that social thought and action be evaluated as
instruments to valued human goals rather than as ends in themselves.
POSNER, supra note 77, at 465. Martha Nussbaum, for example, finds in Judge Posner's
opinions examples of a form of "poetic judging" that she endorses. See MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 104-11 (1995)
(analyzing in detail Judge Posner's opinion in Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors
Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994)). It would take a separate essay to evaluate adequately the
degree of cohesiveness between Judge Posner's more typological views and his views that
remain more attentive to the variability of specific contexts.

